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Transcript*
Showcase Panel III: The States &
Administrative Law
Professor Nestor Davidson, Professor Christopher Green,
Professor Miriam Seifter, The Honorable Jeffrey Sutton,
& The Honorable Michael Scudder
Dean Reuter: Good morning and welcome back to this, the third
day, the best day of The Federalist Society’s National Lawyers Con-
vention. I am still Dean Reuter,1 still Vice President, General Coun-
sel, and Director of Practice Groups at The Federalist Society. But
now I am also in charge of cleaning up the rooms after we finish here.
So if you would please be careful with all your personal belongings,
that would be helpful to me personally.
What a great second day I think we had, and a great night last
night. I thought Jeff Sutton—Judge Jeff Sutton—was terrific as he
delivered the Olson Lecture. So good, in fact, that we’ve invited him
back to be on this morning’s panel. In addition to having heard his
lecture last night, I have read his book.2 And I recommend it highly. It
embraces a view of law and the practice of law that is, I’d say, near
revolutionary but so obvious I wonder why nobody had come up with it
before. It is obviously correct that to not adopt his views, I think,
might rise to the level of legal malpractice.
Hon. Jeffrey Sutton: I’ve got you right where I want you.
Dean Reuter: Yeah. So you might want to buy a copy for yourself,
but also for all your partners and associates to keep your firm out of
trouble. So congratulations, Judge, and welcome back this morning.
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW. If you would like to submit a re-
sponse to this Article in the Nebraska Law Review Bulletin, contact our Online
Editor at lawrev@unl.edu.
* This transcript of a Federalist Society panel presentation given at the 2018 Na-
tional Lawyers Convention on November 17, 2018 has been supplemented with
footnotes and edited for clarity.
1. Dean Reuter, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, https://fedsoc.org/contributors/dean-reu-
ter (last visited Mar. 10, 2019) [https://perma.unl.edu/33ZF-Y5ZM].
2. JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2018).
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Our first panel this morning is titled “The States and Administra-
tive Law.” And we’ve assembled for you this morning what I consider
to be a truly first-class group of panelists. I do really mean first-class.
I’m very proud of this panel.
But that term, “first-class,” gets overused sometimes. And that, of
course, reminds me of a little story, which takes me back over twenty
years. This story—it also happened in an airport, which might be of
interest to you for that additional reason, since many of you travelled
by plane to get here.
So, twenty years ago or so, I was working for the federal govern-
ment and my children, who are now grown, were at the time very lit-
tle. I was a single parent with custody of my kids so I tried to keep my
travel to a minimum. But one time I had back-to-back trips and I went
to the extraordinary measure of trying to come home just for an
overnight.
But coming back on that first leg of the trip I had severe delays,
landing well after midnight at Dulles airport. I was supposed to have
arrived in time for dinner, tuck my kids into bed, and see them. But
instead, I was merely able to just peek in on them. I climbed into bed
and set my alarm for an early morning flight out. My kids never saw
me, although I did see them, before I headed back to Dulles at day-
break the next day.
That morning I was in the check-in line—still dark outside—wait-
ing. And I was on one of the budget airlines, which I would charitably
describe as a younger airline. It no longer exists. It died before it
reached puberty for reasons that might become apparent here in a
minute. But I got to the front of the line, and I saw an impossibly
young man behind the counter to greet me. He looked like he should
have been catching the bus to his middle school at that hour of the
day. And I was wearing a suit. I had a well-worn trench coat; a some-
what battered, wheeled suitcase; and a well-used briefcase—I looked
just like the stereotypical business traveler. So I was a little surprised
when the young man, way too happy at that hour of the morning,
asked me, “Is this your first time flying?”
Now, having landed at that very airport just a few hours before—
after midnight, in fact, that morning—I was able to reply, somewhat
snarkily, “This isn’t my first time travelling today.” And, of course,
that remark went right over his head.
Anyhow, I was worn out by this time and I thought I’d use my own
money to try to get some extra leg room. So I said, “Do you have any-
thing in the economy-plus section?” “No, sir,” he replied, without fur-
ther elaboration. So now I was willing to plunk down my own money,
some real money, to upgrade to first class. “Do you have anything
available in first class?” I asked, hopefully. And then, without paus-
ing, almost as if he had anticipated my question, he said, “Sir, all our
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seats are first-class.” “Of course they are,” I said. By that time I was
totally defeated.
But our panel is truly first-class.
And I’m very pleased to introduce our moderator—if you want to
applaud, you can. Judge Michael Scudder of the Seventh Circuit, I be-
lieve, is making his first appearance at our convention as a moderator
today. And we’re very pleased to have him here. Incidentally, if you
haven’t noticed, we have over—I did the math on this—we have over
20% of the active federal appellate bench involved in the convention
this year. They’re doing everything, including cleaning up rooms
afterward.
Judge Scudder attended St. Joseph’s College and then Northwest-
ern University Law School, a very fine institution. He clerked for
Judge Niemeyer on the Fourth Circuit and then Justice Kennedy. He
was at Jones Day Cleveland, which some people might know as the
home office of that law firm, and then as an Assistant United States
Attorney in the Southern District of New York. He’s also served in the
White House Counsel’s Office and the National Security Council. He’s
been serving on the Seventh Circuit since earlier this year. And I’m
very pleased to have him with us this morning. So, please, do join me
in welcoming Judge Michael Scudder.
Hon. Michael Scudder: Thank you, Dean. Good morning, every-
one. It’s wonderful to be here. I want to start by just introducing our
panelists and diving right into what I think will be a very vibrant and
illuminating discussion covering a range of pretty timely topics from a
variety of perspectives.
To my left is my good friend, Jeff Sutton.3 Dean was right on the
money, I think, in commending Judge Sutton’s Olson Lecture, yester-
day evening, featuring his book, Fifty-One Imperfect Solutions: States
and the Making of American Constitutional Law.4 I think Jeff is going
to elaborate on some of the points, and then maybe expand upon a
couple of aspects of the points he made yesterday. And just briefly, I
think as most people here know, Judge Sutton serves on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. He, too, is a former Jones Day
lawyer, and is actually the reason I joined Jones Day after clerking for
Justice Kennedy. And, of course, Judge Sutton served as the State So-
licitor of Ohio, was a law clerk to Justice Lewis Powell, Justice
Antonin Scalia, and Judge Meskill on the Second Circuit.
3. Professors: The Honorable Jeffrey S. Sutton, THE OHIO ST. U.: MORITZ C. OF L.,
https://moritzlaw.osu.edu/faculty/the-honorable-jeffrey-s-sutton/ (last visited
Mar. 10, 2019) [https://perma.unl.edu/3NB5-LA9S].
4. SUTTON, supra note 2.
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To Jeff’s left is Chris Green.5 Chris is a law professor at the Uni-
versity of Mississippi, where he also teaches as a scholar in law and
philosophy. Chris graduated from Princeton, Yale Law School, has a
Ph.D. from Notre Dame in philosophy, clerked for Judge Barksdale on
the Fifth Circuit, and teaches in the area of constitutional law, includ-
ing state constitutional law. So, Chris, welcome.
To Chris’s left is Miriam Seifter from the University of Wisconsin
Law School.6 Miriam is a graduate of Yale University, Harvard Law
School, clerked for Chief Judge Garland of the D.C. Circuit and for
Justice Ginsburg at the Supreme Court, worked in private practice a
bit at Munger Tolles in Northern California, and is here this morning
to focus on an aspect of state administrative law that we’ll find pretty
fascinating—looking at agency independence at the state level and
what it says and doesn’t say, more broadly, for the development of
administrative law at the state and federal level.
And to Miriam’s left is Nestor Davidson from Fordham Law
School.7 Nestor teaches in the area of property, land use, and real es-
tate; has a casebook that came out last year on property law, practiced
at Latham & Watkins after graduating from Harvard College and Co-
lumbia Law School; and clerked for Judge Tatel on the D.C. Circuit
and then Justice Souter at the Supreme Court.
So welcome, one and all. Why don’t we start with Judge Sutton
here and invite him to offer his perspective this morning on the topic
that brings us together: the states and administrative law.
Hon. Jeffrey Sutton: At the outset, let me point out one differ-
ence between state structural protections and state individual rights.
With respect to individual rights protected in the state constitutions
and the Bill of Rights, such as free speech, free exercise, and so forth,
there is a two-shots phenomenon, where if you do not like what a state
or local government has done, you can sue, for example, under the
First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause8 and under the counterpart of
that state’s constitution. So that is the individual rights world in
which the lawyer customarily has two shots.
With structure it’s a different story. The U.S. Constitution does not
speak to the structure of the states and their state constitutions. The
republican form of government guarantee in the U.S. Constitution has
5. Faculty Directory: Christopher Green, THE U. OF MISS. SCH. OF L., https://law.ole
miss.edu/faculty-directory/christopher-green/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2019) [https://
perma.unl.edu/2BCB-RTQQ].
6. Miriam Seifter, U. OF WISCONSIN-MADISON L. SCH., https://law.wisc.edu/profiles/
seifter@wisc.edu (last visited Mar. 10, 2019) [https://perma.unl.edu/D8SA-4J6N].
7. Nestor M. Davidson, FORDHAM U. SCH. OF L., https://www.fordham.edu/info/
23127/nestor_m_davidson (last visited Mar. 10 2019) [https://perma.unl.edu/
HK2F-VQHC].
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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been deemed judicially unenforceable to date.9 So that you do not have
this overlay where you can get a state separation of powers problem
and say, “Aha, does the Federal Constitution speak to that? Is there a
second shot?” Not really. You have to be pretty imaginative and a very
persuasive advocate to get someone to think about it that way.
But we still have the dialogue issue, where what is going on at the
state level remains influential at the federal level. And that goes back
to the point that the state constitutions were really the ones that came
up with our original separation of powers doctrine, concepts, and lan-
guage, from 1776 up to 1787. They became the blueprint for what was
pulled together in 1787.
This might be a first in Federalist Society National Conventions,
but you’re getting an assignment today. Like the republican form of
government guarantee, it may be unenforceable. But here it is. Each
of you should take 15 minutes to read your own state constitution. You
will be so struck by the differences in length, language, and specificity
about structure.
One reason for the difference is that, at the U.S. level, there’s been
just one Constitutional Convention. That’s it, followed by twenty-
seven amendments. We know how difficult the Constitution is to
amend. At the state level, there have been over 300 conventions. The
norm at the state level is plenty of amendments, in part because
they’re so easy to amend. All the state constitutions require, usually,
is a fifty-one percent vote. So you have a lot more specificity, whether
it’s structure or rights. You will learn a lot in a fifteen-minute over-
view of your state’s constitution.
Another feature you will see regarding separation of powers is a
difference between the unitary executive at the federal level and what
I’ll call the plural executive at the state level. In the states we typi-
cally have separate elections for state attorney general, secretaries of
state, treasurers, auditors, and the like. That creates all kinds of fasci-
nating separation of powers problems within the state. Having worked
at a state attorney general’s office, I can attest to one in particular:
Who is in charge of the litigating position of the state? A separately
elected attorney general? A separately elected governor?
The state attorneys general usually win that battle, at least as a
matter of case law. But I can tell you from experience that’s really not
what goes on. I can illustrate it with a story. It may be apocryphal.
But it has a ring of truth to it.
At the time, the Ohio governor and attorney general came from
different parties. They had more than one reason to disagree about a
politically charged case, the subject of which I do not recall. The attor-
ney general and the governor went back and forth about what the
9. Id. art. IV, § 4; see Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849).
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state’s litigation position was going to be. Finally, the attorney general
had had enough. So he said to the governor, “Okay, fine. We will do it
your way. I will send a lawyer over in 15 minutes.”
Clever man that he was, the attorney general found the greenest,
youngest guy in the office. He gave him a yellow pad and a pen and
sent him over to the governor’s office. In marches a young guy who
does not know a lot—and looks like he knows even less. The governor,
within five seconds, realizes, “Oh, this is not going to work.” So he
says, “Why don’t you wait outside?” The governor calls the attorney
general back and says, “You win.” Sometimes practical realities carry
the day.
Let me turn to two significant state separation of powers issues:
nondelegation and deference to administrative agencies.10 One gripe
of mine is that state courts too often engage in lockstepping in con-
struing their state constitutions—that is, they reflexively follow what
the U.S. Supreme Court is doing with similar guarantees and similar
issues. That is a serious problem in the individual rights arena. But it
is not a problem in the structure arena. It turns out that the state
courts are quite independent when it comes to construing the struc-
tural guarantees in their state constitutions. I don’t know if that’s be-
cause those issues have less political resonance, or whether it’s
because the state guarantees are so much more specific in terms of
structure. But there are plenty of differences here.
You first see this in the gap between what’s going on with the
nondelegation doctrine at the state and federal levels. At the federal
level it looks like a delegation doctrine. On the federal level there is
not, save for 1935, a nondelegation doctrine. Whereas at the state
level there is a judicially enforceable nondelegation doctrine. Judge
Ginsburg, Jim Rossi, and Steve Menashi have shown that about half
the states seriously enforce that doctrine.11 That’s interesting on two
levels. First for the states. It’s important to respect state separation of
powers. But it’s also quite fascinating for what that body of law means
for the federal side. Those state experiences sometimes can be rele-
vant from an originalist and pragmatic perspective.
The states’ experience can be most relevant when it comes to deal-
ing with what has been the biggest practical problem with the
nondelegation doctrine at the federal level: the concern about line
drawing. That concern seemed to be one of the things motivating Jus-
tice Scalia, who we all know cared deeply about structure, but was
10. Cf. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
11. See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Our Illiberal Administrative Law,
10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 475, 492–93 (2016); James Rossi, Institutional Design
and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideas in the
States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1196–97 (1999); see also SUTTON, supra note 2, at
177 n.15.
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hesitant to enforce the nondelegation doctrine. He seemed to be con-
cerned about the capacity of the courts to manage that line. What is
fascinating—I think someone needs to look at this—is how the states
are doing in the nondelegation area. Because if state courts can do it
in a non-arbitrary fashion, it’s fair to wonder whether the federal
courts can do it.
The states are all over the map when it comes to deference to ad-
ministrative agencies.12 A growing number of state courts now take
quite seriously the idea that courts, in contrast to Chevron, should not
give deference to agencies’ interpretations of statutes.13 And not just
for statutory reasons, but for constitutional separation of powers rea-
sons under their state constitution. For example, Justice Dan Kelly of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court wrote a wonderful opinion on the issue.
And that case illustrates the state-level debate. Justice Kelly’s opinion
focuses on the state constitution and denies administrative deference
as a matter of state constitutional requirements, while other justices
on the court took a constitutional avoidance approach to the issue.14
For another example, a recent case in Mississippi viewed this as a
pure constitutional separation of powers issue.15 What’s fun about
this case is you have a dialogue between the states and the U.S. Su-
preme Court, at least with then-Judge Gorsuch on the Tenth Circuit,
about how to manage the separation of powers issues underlying
Chevron.16 But again, to make a practical point: One of the great con-
cerns at the federal level about getting rid of Chevron is this anxiety of
how would this work in Washington with all these agencies and with
so many laws to implement? What happened at the state level? What
happened when the agencies didn’t get deference? Did that really shut
the agency down when it came to doing its job and administering this
statute or that statute? So that experience too, not just doctrinally,
but as a matter of practical, on-the-ground experience, is worth
examining.
Hon. Michael Scudder: We’ll go to Professor Green now. He’s go-
ing to share the results of pretty extensive survey work that he’s done
looking at decisions at the state level and their application—or lack
thereof—of some doctrines that many in the room will know well that
exist in federal administrative law, and what the experience has been
12. Compare Kokochak v. W. Va. State Lottery Comm’n, 695 S.E.2d 185 (W. Va.
2010) (recognizing Chevron deference) with In re Complaint of Rovas, 754 N.W.2d
259 (Mich. 2013) (declining to adopt Chevron deference).
13. See King v. Miss. Military Dep’t, 245 So.3d 404 (Miss. 2018).
14. Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, 914 N.W. 2d 21 (Wis. 2018).
15. King, 245 So.3d at 404.
16. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
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at the state level as far as enhancing accountability and transparency
vis-a`-vis agency action. So, Chris, it is in your hands.
Prof. Christopher Green: Well, thanks. Thanks for the opportu-
nity to be here. I should say thanks especially for the opportunity to
present something in such preliminary form. Last summer at the
Southeast Association of Law Schools meeting, I was on a panel with
Judge Sutton. And a law professor who had worked for the Judge as
an associate said or joked, “We shouldn’t get paid by the hour, we
should get paid by the fifty state survey.” I’ve got three surveys; but
none of them are full fifty state surveys. I worry that I really shouldn’t
get paid.
One of the most frustrating things I encounter looking at state con-
stitutional law issues is the thirty-five state surveys. There are a
whole bunch of states on one side of the issue. There are a bunch of
states on the other. Well, what about the others?! And that maybe
says something more about my presence on the Asperger’s spectrum
that I can’t even until I get a fifty state survey.
So what am I talking about? I’m also, I think, the only presenter at
the conference with a handout. I thought surely somebody else would
have a handout, but it’s probably just me.17 Maybe somebody later
today.
These are three areas where judges are saying to state administra-
tors, “Hey, you haven’t explained yourself enough.” These are three
contexts in which that can happen; judges might or might not draw an
adverse inference from the failure to explain a result.
Okay, so why might we want to have a doctrine like that? Because
the experts might not know what they don’t know. The experts might
think they know things that they don’t actually know. Socrates was
said to be the wisest man because he knew he knew nothing.18 Hayek
focused on what the government doesn’t know about what prices
ought to be.19 I don’t remember the character in Magnum Force who
said, “A man’s got to know his limitations.”20 And women and agen-
cies and artificial entities. It’s hard to know your own limitations.
17. Handout, Christopher Green, Three Ways to Make State Administrators Explain
Themselves (Nov. 17, 2018) (on file with Christopher Green).
18. See BENJAMIN JOWETT, 1 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 337 (1871) (“And I am called
wise, for my haters always imagine that I myself possess the wisdom which I find
wanting in others: but the truth is, O men of Athens, that God only is wise; and in
this oracle he means to say that the wisdom of men is little or nothing; he is not
speaking of Socrates, he is only using my name as an illustration, as if he said,
‘He, O men, is the wisest, who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is in truth
worth nothing.”).
19. See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519
(1945).
20. Magnum Force (The Malpaso Company 1973).
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Part of the idea is you have experts. They know stuff. Okay, no
question about that. One way to test whether the experts really know
stuff is to have the experts try to explain it to a generalist audience.
As a normative matter, you might think, “Well, no. The generalists
just can’t understand it; the failure of the generalists to understand
some area might just be like, well, it’s like the failure of my seven-
year-old to understand the sense-reference distinction, or something.”
Although, my seven-year-old can. My three-year-old doesn’t get it. My
seven-year-old does.
So normatively, I really don’t know. I’m just trying to get a
description.
The three areas are, first, hard-look review where a court says,
“Hey, you haven’t explained yourself enough.”21 Second, the replace-
ment of Chevron22 by Skidmore.23 So if you take away Chevron defer-
ence, you say, well, we’re not going to just defer to you because the
statute’s ambiguous. One way to think about what happens when we
cast Chevron overboard is you return to Skidmore.24 So Skidmore, of
course, in 1944, says, even though an agency doesn’t have authority, it
might be able to persuade us.25 Anybody might be able to persuade us.
So Mike Rappaport argues that we shouldn’t even have Skidmore def-
erence because, after all, private entities don’t get deference. Well,
maybe private entities should. So I come into court, I develop an ex-
pertise, I have consistency over time, all those factors giving me—or a
lawyer, or the American Law Institute, anybody—the “power to per-
suade, if lacking power to control.”26 Well, you should defer to them in
the sense of agreeing with them because they offer persuasive rea-
sons. Overton Park27 and State Farm28 say, hey, you got to give a rea-
son for your regulation. Skidmore says, you got to give a reason for
your interpretation of the law.29
21. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
22. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
23. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 140 (“We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Ad-
ministrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of
their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control.”).
26. Id.
27. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
28. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
29. Skidmore, 323 U.S. 134.
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The third area is I think considerably less well-known. It was
abandoned by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1931 in a case called
O’Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins.30 So in 1931 you had
O’Gorman.31 In 1934 you had Nebbia.32 In 1937 you had West Coast
Hotel.33 This is part of the surprisingly long story about the collapse of
economic liberty during the New Deal in the 1930s under the Four-
teenth Amendment. In 1931 we had a case where a state came in and
said, “We’re going to have some restrictions.”34 The litigants came in
and said, “They haven’t explained why we need these restrictions.
You’re telling insurers they had to have an in-state agent.” On its face,
it looked like rent seeking legislation.35 I’ve got my little deadweight
loss diagram on the handout.36 It looked like that. It looked like you’re
just trying to restrict supply to redistribute wealth to the sellers,
harming society but benefiting particular insurers.
The four conservatives on the Court said, “In order to justify the
denial of the right to make private contracts, some special circum-
stances sufficient to indicate the necessity therefore must be shown by
the party relying upon the denial.”37 They’re in litigation, okay?
You’re arguing to an agency saying, “This regulation doesn’t make any
sense.” The administrator says, “Well, it’s up to you to show that it’s
unconstitutional. It’s not up to me to show that it’s justified. I have to
have a reason for regulation?” So in 1931, the Supreme Court says,
yeah, we’re not going to draw any adverse inference from the failure of
an administrative agency or a litigant to justify that regulation.38
It seems to me, looking at the early, early state constitutional law
that state courts exercising judicial review have a duty not to leave
evidence on the table, not to fail to make proper inferences from things
like that. I cited in the handout a bunch of early cases.39 I call this the
“duty to clarify.” So we have a duty not to strike down statutes unless
30. O’Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co, 282 U.S. 251 (1931).
31. Id.
32. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
33. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
34. O’Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co, 282 U.S. 251, 255 (1931) (quot-
ing New Jersey Laws 1928, c. 128, p. 258).
35. See id. at 251.
36. See Microeconomics Individual Assignment, https://sites.google.com/site/amieran
myusuf/shortages-led-to-deadweight-loss (last visited May 19, 2019) [https://per
ma.unl.edu/VS43-T2MM].
37. See id. at 269 (Van Devanter, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 257–58.
39. Green, supra note 18 (citing Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 408 (1792); Whittington v.
Polk, I H. & J. 236, 245 (Md. 1802); Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90
(1822); In re Wellington, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 87 (1834); U of Md. Regents v. Wil-
liams, 9 G. & J. 365, 384 (Md. 1838), Lane v. Doe, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 237, 240 (1841),
Franklin Bridge Co v. Wood, 14 Ga. 80, 83–84 (1853), City of Lafayette v. Jen-
ners, 10 Ind. 70, 80 (1857), Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Miller, 19 W.Va. 408,
422 (1882), Varner v. Martin, 21 W.Va. 534, 543 (1883), Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpen-
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it’s clear that a statute violates a state constitution. But you also have
a duty to clarify, and that means not leaving evidence on the table.
So these are three places where a court can tell an agency, hey, you
haven’t explained yourself. There’s a bunch of other people who might
tell an agency, “Hey, you haven’t sufficiently explained yourself.” So I
think this is going to become an article—Ten Ways to Make State Ad-
ministrators Explain Themselves. And I’ll just rattle seven of these
off.
First, what’s a nondelegation doctrine? It says, hey, agency, you
can’t just adopt this. You’ve got to persuade the legislature. The legis-
lature—a bunch of non-expert generalists. So you could have to per-
suade a legislature.40
Second, you could have to persuade a state OIRA (Office of Infor-
mation and Regulatory Affairs), which is what Miriam has looked at
in great detail.41
Third, you might have to persuade other agencies who have a
stake, so that is another way that state OIRA would be involved.
Fourth, you might have to persuade the agency itself, if you have a
separation of prosecution and adjudication within the agency—New
Jersey and Georgia, I’m told by people at this conference, have that
sort of doctrine.42
ter, 61 P. 258, 263–64 (Wyo. 1900), State ex rel. Hildebrandt v. Fitzgerald, 134
NW 728, 730 (Minn. 1912), State v. Snyder, 212 P. 758, 759 (Wyo. 1923)).
40. See, e.g., Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist
Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1193–97 (1999);
Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454 (Tex.
1997); Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1979); State v. Wil-
liams, 583 P.2d 251 (Ariz. 1978); Stofer v. Motor Vehicle Cas. Co., 369 N.E.2d 875
(Ill. 1977); Legislative Research Comm’n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984);
Op. of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 471 N.E.2d 1266 (Mass.
1984); Bacus v. Lake Cty., 354 P.2d 1056 (Mont. 1960); Kwik Shop, Inc. v. City of
Lincoln, 498 N.W.2d 102 (Neb. 1993); Clark Cty. v. Luqman, 697 P.2d 107 (Nev.
1985); Guillou v. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 503 A.2d 838 (N.H. 1986); Montoya v.
O’Toole, 610 P.2d 190, 191–92 (N.M. 1980); Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350
(N.Y. 1987); Blue Cross v. Ratchford, 416 N.E.2d 614, 618 (Ohio 1980); Oliver v.
Okla. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 359 P.2d 183, 187 (Okla. 1961); Common-
wealth v. Sessoms, 532 A.2d 775, 784 (Pa. 1987) (Papadakos, J., concurring); In re
Application No. 5189-3, 467 N.W.2d 907 (S.D. 1991); Bauer v. S.C. State Hous.
Auth., 246 S.E.2d 869 (S.C. 1978); Chapel v. Commonwealth, 89 S.E.2d 337 (Va.
1955); State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1981); State v.
Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977).
41. See Miriam Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, 131 HARV. L. REV. 484 (2017);
Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 3-202(a) (1981) (“To the extent the
agency itself would have authority, the governor may rescind or suspend all or a
severable portion of a rule of an agency.”).
42. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-10(c) (2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-41 (2018); In re
Op. No. 583 of the Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, 526 A.2d 692, 696 (N.J. 1987)
(stating that New Jersey statutes take “more direct approach to the conflicts
raised by the dual functions of administrative agencies” than federal law); cf. 5
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Fifth, you might have to persuade the agency at a later time. The
agency adopts a rule, but it might be easy to reverse it. So Fox v.
FCC43 issues at the state level would be important, and there are a
number of other doctrines that allow future agencies to reverse deci-
sions.44 So unless the agency makes a persuasive case to its future
self, it’s not going to last.
Sixth, you might have the public. A transparency requirement
says, hey, if you’re going to do something, you’ve got to tell the world,
and give them a chance to overrule it and talk to their legislature.45
That’s less effective.
Seventh and finally, you might have juries. You might bring in
twelve members of the public and say, well, you know, we think we
should be at quantity one instead of quantity zero on this thing. We
think we should ban cigarettes. What do you people think? That would
be, as Philip Hamburger says, quite a limit on agencies.46
Anyway, am I out of my eight minutes? Maybe close to it. But there
is exciting stuff going on in all of these areas.
William Funk in 1991 I think is, as far as I found, the only one to
assess the ground of hard-look review in the states.47 He said, it looks
U.S.C. § 554(d) (providing that subject to certain exceptions, “[t]he employee who
presides at the reception of evidence . . . may not . . . be responsible to or subject
to the supervision or direction of an employee or agent engaged in the perform-
ance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency.”).
43. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (holding that no special
reason is required to change rule under arbitrary and capricious review).
44. See, e.g., Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 3-201(“For each rule, the
[annual] report must include, at least once every [7] years, a concise statement of:
(1) the rule’s effectiveness in achieving its objectives, including a summary of any
available data supporting the conclusions reached; (2) criticisms of the rule dur-
ing the previous [7] years, including a summary of any petitions for waiver of the
rule tendered to the agency or granted by it; and (3) alternative solutions to the
criticisms and the reasons for the changes.”); Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n,
135 S. Ct. 1199, 1206 (2015) (“Because an agency is not required to use notice-
and-comment procedures to issue an initial interpretive rule, it is also not re-
quired to use those procedures when it amends or repeals that interpretive
rule.”).
45. See, e.g., Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 3-201(3) (1981) (providing
that periodic review of rules must be “available for public inspection”).
46. See Philip Hamburger, The Inversion of Rights and Power, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 731,
757 (2015) (“A further example of how power nowadays defeats enumerated
rights can be found in the public rights doctrine. Under this doctrine, the govern-
ment’s pursuit of its ‘public rights’ in administrative adjudications defeats the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury.”); see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430
U.S. 442, 444 (1977) (“Congress may create a new cause of action in the Govern-
ment for civil penalties enforceable in an administrative agency where there is no
jury trial.”); cf. SCI Mgmt. Corp. v. Sims, 71 P.3d 389 (Haw. 2003) (requiring a
jury trial in review of Hawaii Human Rights Commission).
47. See William Funk, Rationality Review of State Administrative Rulemaking, 43
ADMIN. L. REV. 147 (1991).
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like a lot of states don’t have hard-look review.48 I couldn’t find that
many. Wisconsin was actually one of them,49 but not too many. It was
a little unclear in Florida.50 But lots and lots of states had something
like hard-look review, at least in name.51 Funk suggested that it was
48. Id. at 147 (“[A] large number of states do not provide for and consciously avoid
judicial review for rationality of rulemaking.”).
49. See Wis. Federated Humane Soc’ys v. Stepp, No. 2013AP902, 2014 WL 3359323,
at *15 (Wis. Ct. App. July 10, 2014) (holding “failure to explain its rulemaking
decisions” does not entail that agency’s decision is arbitrary or capricious and
discussing at length Liberty Homes, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus., Labor and Human
Relations, 401 N.W.2d 805 (Wis. 1987)).
50. See Dep’t of Highway Safety v. Marks, 898 So. 2d 1063, 1064 (Fla Dist. Ct. App.
2005) (calling Overton Park “illuminating”); Homich v. Lake Cty. Sch. Bd., 779
So. 2d 567, 567, 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (“Federal cases . . . statutes and . . .
rules relied upon by the appellants are not applicable to this case” over Overton
Park-relying dissent); Bayonet Point Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab.
Servs., 516 So. 2d 995, 1001–03 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (Ervin, J., concurring)
(discussing Overton Park approvingly).
51. See Wilson v. Madison Cty. Bd. of Educ., 984 So. 2d 1161 (Ala. 2007); Denali
Citizens Council v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 318 P.3d 380 (Alaska 2014); Cali. Hotel &
Motel Ass’n v. Indusr. Welfare Comm’n, 599 P.2d 31 (Cal. 1979); AMAX, Inc. v.
Colo. Water Quality Control Comm’n, 790 P.2d 879, 883 (Colo. 1989) (“[T]he rea-
soning process that led to the adoption of the rule must be defensible.”);
Manchester Envtl. Coal. v. Stockton, 441 A.2d 68 (Conn. 1981); Kreshtool v.
Delmarva Power & Light, 310 A.2d 649 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973); Greer v. Ill. Hous.
Dev. Auth., 524 N.E.2d 561 (Ill. 1988); Ombudsman v. Edwards, 825 N.W.2d 8
(Iowa 2012); Friends of Bethany Place v. City of Topeka, 307 P.3d 1255 (Kan.
2013); Faust v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 89 (Ky. 2004); Cannatella v. City
Civil Serv. Comm’n, 381 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that
agency decisions must attend to “relevant considerations”); Frederick Classical
Charter Sch. v. Frederick Cty. Bd. of Educ., 164 A.3d 285 (Md. 2017); Great
Lakes Steel Div. of Nat’l Steel Corp. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 344 N.W.2d 321
(Mich. 1983); Manufactured Hous. Inst. v. Petterson, 347 N.W.2d 238, 243–46
(Minn. 1984) (holding that the agency Commissioner’s determination violates
substantive due process if “no explanation of how the conflicts and ambiguities in
the evidence are resolved, no explanation of any assumptions made or the suppo-
sitions underlying such assumptions, and no articulation of the policy judg-
ments”); In re Minn. Power for Auth. to Increase Rates for Elec. Serv., 838
N.W.2d 747, 767 (Minn 2013) (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“[I]t may be time to
adopt a version of hard look review in Minnesota”); Titan Tire of Natchez v. Miss.
Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, 891 So. 2d 195 (Miss. 2004); Enters v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 349 S.W.3d 337 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); Hobble Diamond Ranch v. State ex
rel. Mont. Dep’t of Transport., 268 P.3d 31 (Mont. 2012); In re Conservation Law
Found. of New England, Inc., 507 A.2d 652, 659 (N.H. 1986) (explaining that rea-
soned “reasoned consideration” must be given to each pertinent factor); Webster
Assocs. v. Town of Webster, 447 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981); Abell v. Nash
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 321 S.E.2d 502 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); In re Ohio Power Co., 40
N.E.3d 1060 (Ohio 2015), Metcalf v. Okla. Bd. of Med. Licensure & Supervision,
848 P.2d 48 (Okla. Civ. App. 1992), State Bd. of Health v. Godfrey, 290 S.E.2d 875
(Va. 1982); Conservation Law Found. v. Burke, 645 A.2d 495 (Vt. 1993), Frymier-
Halloran v. Paige, 458 S.E.2d 780 (W. Va. 1995); Wilson Advisory Comm. v. Bd of
Cty. Comm’rs, 292 P.3d 855 (Wyo. 2012).
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just boilerplate in all of them. But if you have a regulation and if no
one else can help, maybe you can cite one of these cases.
Chevron—there have been four states that have cast it off this year
in four different ways. Mississippi cast it off quite summarily, sud-
denly, and unanimously in our King case,52 a few weeks before the
extremely extensive and widely discussed-at-great-length opinion in
Wisconsin.53 Arizona got rid of it by statute54 and then Florida got rid
of it by constitutional amendment.55
Beyond those, you have a lot of states that the way they apply
Chevron, or the way they apply deference, really has a much more
Skidmore flavor to it.56 So some people call that “Chev-more,” a blend
of Chevron and Skidmore. Justice Breyer’s approach in the Mead
Corp. line suggests that the trigger for Chevron deference is giving a
persuasive reason.57 Okay, that’s essentially like having Skidmore in-
stead of Chevron. So there’s lots of cases saying that.
Finally, in O’Gorman58 you find a bunch of states that actually do
draw an adverse inference,59 including Florida.60 They say,
“O’Gorman? That’s not the rule here. If an agency doesn’t give an ex-
planation for why they’re doing it, we’re going to draw an adverse in-
52. King v. Miss. Military Dep’t, 245 So. 3d 404 (Miss. 2018).
53. Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, 914 N.W.2d 21 (2018).
54. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-910 (2018).
55. FLA. CONST. art. 5 § 21.
56. See, e.g., Huber v. Kenna, 205 P.3d 1158 (Colo. 2009).
57. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 225 (2002) (following United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)) (noting the “need for agency expertise and ad-
ministrative experience lead us to read the statute as delegating to the Agency
considerable authority”); Christiansen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 596 (2000)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (following Skidmore, stating that “Chevron made no rele-
vant change”).
58. O’Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931).
59. Hoover, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 833 So. 2d 32 (Ala. 2002) (finding no defense of
regulation under dormant commerce clause), State v. Norene, 457 P.2d 926, 930,
936 (Alaska 1969) (enjoining fireworks regulation where “no showing at all as to
what state interest would be served” over dissent complaining on basis of
O’Gorman, noting “no dissent in any jurisdiction”); Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17
(Cal. 1948); Dade Cty. Consumer Advocate’s Office v. Dep’t of Ins., 457 So. 2d 495
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (finding O’Gorman unpersuasive and striking down
anti-insurance-commission-rebate law because of “revolution in consumer’s
rights” undermining “paternalistic approach to a consumer’s ability to make rea-
sonable decisions without government intervention”); People v. Victor, 283 N.W.
666, 670 (Mich. 1939) (striking down inadequately defended law despite dissent’s
invocation of O’Gorman: “No evidence was introduced to prove the contention and
there is no logical connection between the practice of giving a premium and a
tendency to defraud the public. Nor is there any showing that the public is
deceived into buying inferior gasoline by the offering of a premium.”), State v.
Guyette, 102 A.2d 446 (R.I. 1954) (quoting O’Gorman, but finding presumption
rebutted by failure of state to justify).
60. See Dade Cty. Consumer Advocate’s Office v. Dep’t of Ins., 457 So. 2d 495 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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ference.”61 That was 1984. It feels like a long, long time ago, but this
was a long time after 1931. So there is quite a lot of ferment. I hope to
have fifty-state surveys of all these ten areas, so 500 rules of law
nailed down at some point. But watch, google my name at some point
in fifteen years and see if I ever do get these ten surveys done. Thank
you.
Hon. Michael Scudder: Thank you, Chris. So Professor Seifter
has an article that I mentioned coming out in the Michigan Law Re-
view early next year, is it, Miriam?
Prof. Miriam Seifter: That’s right.
Hon. Michael Scudder: And exploring a very fascinating topic.
Perhaps, for the first time that it’s ever really been looked at. And that
is agency independence at the state level. We know well considera-
tions of agency independence at the federal level. And there is lots of
debate, lots of case law, and lots of ink spilled on just how much inde-
pendence is required of the President for an agency to be indepen-
dent—and there are broader structural questions about whether
that’s even constitutional or not. But Professor Seifter is looking at
this at the state level and her forthcoming article,62 I think, pays par-
ticular focus to considerations of independence between a governor
and state agencies. So with that, we’ll ask for an overview.
Prof. Miriam Seifter: Thank you so much. Thank you. I’m very
happy to be here. I’m pleased to be on a “first-class” panel. I didn’t
realize that was going to be the case. And I’m thrilled to be on a panel
that’s focused on the states. I could not agree more with my co-panel-
ists that states are really worth studying.
States are, of course, deeply important in their own right because
it’s state government, after all, through which most of us experience
regulation. State approaches to common problems can also provide an
instructive comparative lens, reminding us that there is more than
one way to do things.
As Judge Scudder said, I’m going to talk today about what agency
independence looks like in the states. By agency independence I mean
the relationship between executive entities and the Chief Executive,
so, of course the President at the federal level and the governor at the
state level.
My focus won’t be on the normative question from yesterday’s ter-
rific panel on agency independence: How much agency independence
61. See id. at 498–99.
62. Miriam Seifter, Understanding State Agency Independence, 117 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019).
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is too much? I think in the states we actually need to go one step prior
to that and just try to unearth a descriptive picture of what is
happening.
What are the legal contours of agency independence in the states?
This is more than just an academic question. Take a recent conflict in
Arizona. Was there anything unlawful or incongruous about a proposi-
tion that just passed giving the governor more authority over the
state’s Clean Election Commission, which has identified itself as an
independent body? Or, for that matter, was it constitutionally re-
quired for the governor to have that sort of authority over the Com-
mission? Or take North Carolina. Was it permissible for the state
legislature there to divest the governor of substantial power over cer-
tain executive commissions? Or in a number of states, as Judge Sutton
alluded to, what if the governor and the state attorney general
disagree?
The question I’ve been looking at is, what is the going legal frame-
work for analyzing these questions? I’ve studied state constitutions,
state legislation, and state judicial decisions doing the beloved fifty
state surveys, and I’ve looked specifically at issues like the selection of
an officer, the removal of an officer, and the ability of the governor to
direct the officer once they are in office. For the full story, you can
check out my forthcoming article that Judge Scudder mentioned, but
it’s barely ten a.m. You don’t want to read that. So I’m here to give you
the Cliffs-Notes version.
My thesis, basically, is that states’ approach to agency indepen-
dence is very different from the way the federal realm has approached
it. States employ a version of agency independence that is different for
different agencies, unclear legally, and unstable over time. To flesh
this out, let me draw out four big picture differences. I’ll draw upon
differences regarding state constitutions, state courts, state legisla-
tures, and state norms.
The first difference is in state constitutional law. Perhaps this is
the most obvious difference. It’s the one that Judge Sutton mentioned.
Almost every state constitution creates what we can call a “plural”
executive branch in which multiple officers are, first of all, created
separately from the governor, and then many of them are also elected
separately. This obvious difference might seem to lead to an obvious
conclusion that states are, therefore, home to a more robust indepen-
dence all around. But that conclusion is actually not obvious, and, in
fact, most state courts have not so held. And the reason for this is that
most state constitutions also have clauses that empower their gover-
nors, often to a degree that’s not present in the Federal Constitution.
Many constitutions say that the governor has the “supreme executive
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power.”63 A number of state constitutions have gubernatorial supervi-
sion clauses or particularly robust take care clauses,64 all of which
seem to support an argument for gubernatorial control.
Now, the positive law picture gets even more complex once you fold
in state legislation. One of the things that I found really interesting in
my study was that of the vast majority of officials within the plural
executive branch nationwide, the state constitution leaves either all or
some of their powers to state legislatures. A typical formulation is
something like, “There shall be a state treasurer with duties to be pre-
scribed by the legislature.” And many state legislatures have, at vari-
ous times, particularly during times of executive branch
reorganization, decided to give the governor power over various execu-
tive officials, including those that might superficially seem to be inde-
pendent. So, in many states, the question of independence presents an
interpretive challenge.
Now, that leads me to the second part of our descriptive journey
here. What have state courts done in confronting this challenge, and
how is it different from what federal courts do? To paraphrase every-
body’s favorite administrative law case, United States v. Mead65—that
was an administrative law joke—the states have generally tailored in-
dependence to variety. Now, there are a few state courts that don’t fit
this description. There are a few state courts that have held that the
governor’s supreme executive authority means that the governor has
to control all agencies. And on the flip side there’s at least one state
court that has indicated that the plural executive structure creates a
sort of categorical, constitutional independence across the board.
But most state courts have proceeded with what I call a non-bi-
nary, non-categorical approach. Non-binary because they don’t divide
the world into independent agencies and not independent agencies the
way we sometimes teach at the federal level. And non-categorical be-
cause most states don’t even use the term “independent agency.” It’s
not a “thing,” as my students would say. And they don’t use any simi-
lar, synonymous terms to invoke this idea that there’s a trans-sub-
stantive category of this “thing” called an independent agency. Most
state courts also don’t assume from the presence of one factor—like,
let’s say, tenure protection—that an agency must fit some set, pre-
determined mold of independence. Instead, most state courts resolve
questions of independence in a clause-based and context-sensitive
way.
For example, it’s not unusual for a state court facing an intra-exec-
utive dispute to say, okay, this is an officer or agency that the gover-
nor either doesn’t appoint because they’re separately selected or whom
63. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. V, § 1; KAN. CONST. art. I, § 3.
64. See ALA. CONST. art. V, § 120.
65. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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the governor can’t remove at will. But that doesn’t preclude us from
concluding that the governor can nonetheless direct or veto this
agency or official over certain decisions if that’s the best reading of the
statute.
It’s worth noting here that this state approach resonates with a
rising critique regarding federal jurisprudence on agency indepen-
dence and on the separation of powers more broadly. Scholars of va-
ried perspectives have argued that federal courts do too much
abstracting on these issues. John Manning, for example, has argued
that there’s no freestanding separation of powers doctrine, and so
courts should engage in what he calls “ordinary interpretation” of the
most relevant clauses at issue.66
Similarly, on this specific topic of independent agencies, Kirti
Datla and Ricky Revesz have asserted an idea that courts shouldn’t
embrace abstractions about agency independence either.67 They
should just follow the terms of whatever the statute says. The states
present this real-life judicial system in which to see this alternative
approach in action.
The third difference I want to talk about has to do with legisla-
tures. State legislatures—and for that matter, state initiatives and
state referenda—have played a more active role in tinkering with
agency independence over time. I think this is different from the fed-
eral realm where we often think of, at least, the highest levels of
agency structure as part of the rules of the game: those features that
stay put even when political fortunes change. Even if Congress, for
example, is upset with the decision by, say, the FCC, we don’t imagine
that Congress’s next move will be to change the FCC from an indepen-
dent agency to an executive agency. Or at least that would be a big
deal.
But state legislatures do that pretty regularly, as I document in
the article. One implication that is worth noting here is this sort of
legislative volatility raises the possibility that it will really undermine
independence in a deep way. How independent can you be if your inde-
pendence itself is up for grabs depending on what you decide?
The fourth and final difference I want to point out has to do with
norms. The state sphere may reflect weaker norms about what inde-
pendence means. I think partly this flows from the legislative volatil-
ity I’ve described and from the lack of a categorical, judicial approach
to independence. In other words, maybe agency independence in the
states is just too much of a moving and evolving target for a strong
norm to emerge. Partly, it may also be because state legal communi-
66. John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 1939, 1944 (2011).
67. Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Exec-
utive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (2013).
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ties tend to lack some of the norm producing institutions that the fed-
eral government has. Most law schools, to Judge Sutton’s and my
disappointment, don’t teach classes in state constitutional law. And
also, not all state executive branches or state bars have entities analo-
gous to, say, the Office of Legal Counsel, who really devote their time
to developing a keen and lasting understanding of executive power.
Unlike at the federal level where scholars have recently been docu-
menting how unwritten rules regarding independence actually ex-
plain a lot of the behavior that you see from both presidents and
agency officials, in many states, the issue seems to be more up for
grabs.
Let me close with just a few implications of these findings. The
first—and this echoes something that Judge Sutton said—is that
state courts deserve credit, I think, in this area. They’re dealing with
really challenging materials. They are not lockstepping with federal
law the way they’re sometimes criticized for in other areas. And these
cases are really a rich resource for anyone who’s interested in study-
ing executive power.
A second implication has to do with what I think of as the twin
effects of precision on one side of the coin and uncertainty on the
other. So, state legislatures’ practice of creating different indepen-
dence for different agencies and then changing it over time, and state
judicial practice of hewing to those choices have this democratic ap-
peal. Maybe the people are getting exactly the independence they
want in each different context. But the flip side of that narrow, clause-
based, context-specific approach, may be that the law is less certain
and less predictable and harder to anticipate for any given actor.
Now, this raises a question about practical effects. In particular,
does the uncertainty and instability for some officers mean that they
have less operational independence? Even if the law makes them nom-
inally independent, will they feel less independent because of
lawmakers frequently revisiting their independence?
And then, finally, whatever the answer is to these other questions,
I’ll come back to the value of teaching state administrative law and
state constitutional law in law schools. It can add so much to our un-
derstanding and to our discourse. In all events, I’m happy to be on a
panel highlighting state law, so thanks for having me today.
Hon. Michael Scudder: Thank you, Miriam. Nestor Davidson
has done some work and published it in the Yale Law Journal, if mem-
ory serves, on administrative law at the local level—at the municipal
level, at the county level, at the village level—and is going to offer
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some perspectives today on what we can learn from administrative
law at that level.68
Prof. Nestor Davidson: Thank you so much. And thank you all
for showing up at 9:00 in the morning on a Saturday to think about
state, and I will now add, local administrative law. We literally have
people in the rafters. This is pretty stunning. So thank you. I also
think it’s a particularly timely moment to be thinking about the sub-
federal level. Given the nature of the hydraulics of policymaking in
this country when we are having a very deregulatory moment at the
federal level and some gridlock on areas where the federal govern-
ment has been traditionally very active, a lot of the energy for regulat-
ing is moving to the state and I think local level, as well. And so I
think it’s appropriate, as governance is evolving in many areas, to be
paying very close attention to the mechanics and the law that is gov-
erning that evolutionary, regulatory environment.
My brief this morning, as Judge Scudder mentioned, is a pretty
simple one. I want to argue that it’s important to pay attention not
just to the critical questions at the state level about agency indepen-
dence and about deference, but at the local as well. And Miriam has
unpacked some of the horizontal questions that are so critical. And let
me try and unpack some of the vertical questions within the states
that I think are also fairly critical.
To begin, I think it’s important to remember that much of what we
think of as within the realm of how states operate is through local
governments. And whether we think that local governments are an
arm of the state or a local polity or some hybrid version of that, many,
many areas in our federal system that we delegate or that have begun
as matters of state competence and importance are really exercised
through local governments. And it’s terrific to be focusing, as Judge
Sutton has done, on individual rights at the state level, but govern-
mental structure, I think, is equally important.
So much of what local governments do—and this is not just in the
delivery of services, which is obviously a critical aspect of what cities
and counties and suburbs and small towns do—but also as regulators.
Local governments are increasingly acting as regulators—they do so
through administrative bodies. And on the regulatory front, local gov-
ernments are increasingly involved in regulating everything from
workplace conditions to public health, to the environment, to technol-
ogy—many, many areas that I think maybe a generation ago we
would’ve thought of as largely federal areas of concern that states
have always been involved in to some extent are really increasingly
68. Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564 (2017).
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playing out at the local level. And that’s true not just for large cities
but also for smaller, local governments.
And if you look at how local governments are structured, and not
just in New York, or D.C., or Los Angeles, or Chicago, but Oak Park,
and Tuscaloosa, and Barrow, Alaska—and I spent a lot of time looking
at the structure of lots and lots of local communities—you will find a
little, mini version of the alphabet soup we have in terms of agencies
at the federal level. You’ll find a really remarkable array even in rela-
tively small communities. And when I was working on this article, I
would go around the country giving versions of a talk about the arti-
cle, and wherever I was, I would google the night before that particu-
lar local government and you could always find ten, twelve, fifteen
agencies, even in the smallest community. It became a little bit of a
parlor game. But you’ll find health departments, zoning boards, school
boards, police commissions—an entire panoply I like to call this—it’s
not so much the administrative state, but it’s kind of an administra-
tive city-state. It may not be the FCC, it may not be the EPA, but it’s
actually a very important layer of governance.
And if you think about where governance happens today in the
United States, one in thirty-eight people in the country live in New
York City where I live. New York City has more people than Idaho,
Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Nebraska com-
bined. More than eighty percent of the people in the country live in
urban areas, and in many important respects, cities, suburbs, counties
are the most important regulatory layer for that.
Let me just say a few words about structure. Structure is obviously
critical to doctrine. And it’s important to pay attention to structure,
and as interesting as things get on the state level—and they get very
interesting—I think they get even more interesting when you turn the
lens on the microscope and begin to look a little bit lower in the feder-
alist stack. So, for example, many local governments have little or ac-
tually no separation of powers whatsoever. In many local
governments, you have a legislative body that also happens to have an
executive as part of it, or you may have no recognizable elected chief
executive at all. We tend to think of a model of the mayor because
that’s our popular culture. I live in New York and we have a very
strong mayor, relatively speaking.
But in more than half of all local governments, the person who we
would think of as the chief executive of the executive branch is just an
appointed civil servant—a city manager. And they just perform func-
tional duties. Important and critical duties, but there’s no electoral
responsibility, so forget what we know about the unitary executive at
the federal level. Imagine a system where courts are reviewing action
by a government that has no executive or at least no elected executive.
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What does that mean for how we think about separation of powers?
What does that mean for how we think about deference?
Similarly—and I think this is really important—local governments
and local government agencies, in particular, often have a dual struc-
ture of accountability. So local agencies are accountable in the way we
traditionally think of federal agencies towards both the executive and
legislature in their local government of general jurisdiction. And as
hard as it is for fifty-one jurisdictions to draw generalities, there are
over 90,000 local governments in the United States, so I’m radically
oversimplifying here.
But many, many agencies are accountable both to their local gov-
ernment of general jurisdiction and also to the state. And in many
instances, they may have power delegated directly from the state to an
agency. And so we get into these very interesting, almost triangular
relationships between agencies—whose jurisdiction is at a particular
locality and who may have a close or a distant relationship with the
state. I’m talking about independence from the general local govern-
ment, but may have an even closer relationship with the state itself.
And, again, as we think about a jurisprudence of accountability and
transparency, which is really what we’re talking about this morning,
that dual reporting structure and how much power the state delegates
to a local government is really critical.
So, briefly, how might we think about what’s different—taking a
step back—about the context and the structure and what does this
actually mean? I think it’s important to recognize there are reasons
why courts—and here, again, to be clear these are mostly the jurispru-
dence that’s developed around state administrative law, and certainly
around local administrative law is largely a body of state law. It’s
state courts reviewing state actors, which is not to say the federal
courts don’t have something to do with that, but they’re largely not at
the center of this conversation.
How do state courts approach this? I think there are reasons why
at the local level—and whatever we think about state structure—we
tend to see less deference. We tend to see a more intrusive local juris-
prudence to the extent that courts segregate at all. And they generally
don’t, but I think you see concerns in the jurisprudence about capacity
at the local level, about expertise at the local level, and about infor-
mality. In roughly half the states, there’s no equivalent at the local
level to a state Administrative Procedure Act. Having practiced in
land use, when I began as a young lawyer and dutifully looked for
what procedure governed when we were trying to get some zoning
change, I was often very surprised to realize that nobody had any idea
what the procedure was. And you would go into a board and kind of
make it up as you would go along. And that’s not unusual and courts
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do some work in imposing a formality, but really not all that much at
the local level.
And then I think some courts are concerned about parochialism,
scale, and the tendency of some local governments to really not inter-
nalize the external effects of what their regulatory choices are. In this
article, I also lay out some arguments for why we might actually give
more deference or courts might actually give more deference at the
local level. This hasn’t really shown up in the jurisprudence, but I
think it’s important to have out there.
I do think subsidiarity is a really important principle. I think rec-
ognizing that in many regulatory areas, land use being a good exam-
ple, the level of government—to cite the cliche´—is closest to the people
who are being regulated should be able to regulate. That’s not neces-
sarily only a question of power, but that’s also a question of deference.
So I think scale can be a reason for giving more deference to the out-
put of local agencies.
I also think there’s a different kind of expertise you get at the local
level. If you think about the kinds of areas where local governments
may regulate best, local governments can be a kind of tool that aggre-
gates a particular kind of local knowledge. And if you think about how
a state, in the generic sense, sees, local governments have an ability to
see in a more precise and very localized way. And that’s a reason for,
perhaps, giving a little more deference. And I think the fact that the
public is much more involved. So, if you think about zoning boards,
school boards, police commissions, and a lot of local administration—
whether it’s in the quasi-lawmaking context or in the more discretion-
ary application of delegated authority—a lot of local administration is
marbled throughout with public involvement in a way that’s unusual
at the federal level. And I do think that kind of inherent involvement
of the public, which has lots and lots of downsides, may have some
upsides in terms of legitimacy and a ground for deference.
Let me just close with one brief, doctrinal example, and then I look
forward to the Q&A. And we, I think, can talk about what a localist
Chevron,69 or a localist Skidmore,70 or a localist “Chev-more”71 might
look like. But let me pivot to something that Judge Sutton mentioned,
which is nondelegation doctrine. It is true that the nondelegation doc-
trine has more teeth at the state level. It has a lot of teeth at the local
level, and this is really the doctrine that got me interested in thinking
about the interplay between courts and local administration. And it’s
fascinating to see that state courts demand at the local level—again,
recognizing how hard it is to generalize across 90,000 local govern-
69. See Jou v. Hamada, 201 P.3d 614 (Haw. Ct. App. 2009).
70. See King v. Miss. Military Dep’t, 245 So. 3d 404 (Miss. 2018).
71. See Huber v. Kenna, 205 P.3d 1158 (Colo. 2009).
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ments—a much more precise specification of the authority that has
been delegated to an administrative body.
In the article, I give one example of a case out of Maine where a
zoning board was given the authority to review land use decisions—
something called conditional use permits—and the standard was that
they had to evaluate whether or not the change in zoning would “con-
serve natural beauty.”72 And for those of us who look at the state of
delegation at the federal level that’s actually more precise than “regu-
late the air waves in the public interest,” right? That would likely be
upheld at the federal level, but the court in this particular case said
that was not nearly specific enough and struck down the exercise of
that delegated authority.73 And that’s a very typical example.
You often get state courts saying, if a legislature, city council,
county council, or another local legislative body is going to give discre-
tionary authority to a zoning board, a school commission, or the like, it
has to be very precise in the metes and bounds of that delegation. We
can debate the merits of that, but I think it’s interesting to note that
the lower you go down in our federalist structure, the more courts may
be actually requiring some precision in this kind of accountability
conversation.
So I’ll just close by saying I think it’s important, if we think about
the states, to disaggregate between states and local governments. I
think there are many areas where the doctrine is very similar and
appropriately so, and I think that’s true of federal, state, and local
doctrine. But there are many areas where, as Miriam mentioned, if
you look very specifically at a given agency, the given statutes that
govern it, and the structure of a particular local government then
you’re going to come to different answers than you would certainly at
the federal level. And so, I think it’s very important to pay attention to
those given contexts, and I don’t think state courts often do that
enough. And I think we could have a more intentional jurisprudence
as we think about the kind of plurality of structures, and that holds
important, comparative lessons as well. Thank you.
Hon. Michael Scudder: So I want to open it up to the room. I’m
sure there are some questions from the podium, but I invite anyone
with questions. There are microphones on the side aisles or raise your
hand and speak loudly, and we can get some dialogue going in the
room here this morning.
Prof. Nestor Davidson: Good to know you’re not all leaving.
You’re actually going for the microphones.
72. See Davidson, supra note 52, at 623 (citing Kosalka v. Town of Georgetown, 752
A.2d 183 (Me. 2000)).
73. Id.
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Hon. Michael Scudder: Let me put a question out there.
Hon. Jeffrey Sutton: I have to say just one thing. I’ve already
decided what I’m doing in my retirement years. I want to be the first
person in American legal history to do a 90,000 city survey.
Prof. Nestor Davidson: I’ve tried. It’s not easy.
Prof. Christopher Green: I have two bad jokes I wanted to tell.
So if you have a nondelegation doctrine at the city level, a city can’t
just have a dictator.
Prof. Nestor Davidson: Right.
Prof. Christopher Green: So you can’t have Cincinnatus for
Cincinnati.
Prof. Nestor Davidson: There you go.
Prof. Christopher Green: So has it been taken? I’m looking for a
crazy idea about hard-look review that’ll get something from off the
wall to on the table to expand the Overton Park, Overton Window.74
So, anyway, you won’t ask me back.
Hon. Michael Scudder: Okay. We got our queue. I see Steve
Calabresi.
Steve Calabresi: Steve Calabresi.75 I’m the Chairman of The Fed-
eralist Society Board of Directors. And I wanted to begin by commend-
ing this panel for a fascinating discussion about state and local
administrative law. I also have to apologize. I have laryngitis, so I
can’t be heard very clearly. My question was particularly directed to
Judges Sutton and Scudder, but I’d be interested in what the other
three panelists think of it as well. And it goes to something that I
learned from Judge Ralph Winter when I clerked for him in 1983. He
said that when he was young and in law school, there used to be a
saying, “Don’t make a federal case out of this.” And Judge Winter said
in 1983 that that saying should be amended to mean, “Don’t utterly
trivialize this.” In other words, a lot of things that are very trivial are
74. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Joseph Leh-
man, The Overton Window, MACKINAC CTR., https://www.mackinac.org/overton
window (last visited May 19, 2019) [https://perma.unl.edu/9HCD-TS29].
75. Professor Steven Calabresi has been the Chairman of the Federalist Society’s
Board of Directors since 1986 and is the Clayton J. & Henry R. Barber Professor
of Law at Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. Professor Calabresi’s areas of
expertise include federal courts, comparative law, and constitutional law.
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finding their way into federal court that may properly belong in state
court.
My question for the two federal judges and for the other panelists
is if you have a filing before you or an appeal before you that raises
some important federal constitutional question, say, on a controversial
issue like abortion or affirmative action, would it be appropriate to ask
the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to add any state constitutional
law claim that they could have so that the court would have the option
of deciding the issue on state constitutional grounds rather than fed-
eral constitutional grounds? The federal interest in that is if a federal
court of appeals decides a case on state constitutional grounds, its rul-
ing can be overruled by the state supreme court. Its ruling applies to
only one state, not to the three states in the Seventh Circuit or the
four states in the Sixth Circuit. And it might be compatible with the
discussion in Younger v. Harris about the importance of our federal-
ism and of emphasizing the role of the state courts.76 Any thoughts?
Hon. Jeffrey Sutton: What you’re saying, and what makes a lot
of sense, is an exhaustion requirement. And a way to think about this
doctrinally is most federal constitutional claims run through the Due
Process Clause right?77 That’s incorporation, the Liberty Clause.78
And so why wouldn’t you ask yourself if there’s any way in which the
state could fix this problem short of there being a federal constitu-
tional problem? And it is, after all, a due process clause, so it suggests
process; that process could include avoidance—interpret the state
statute to avoid the problem. It could involve a state regulation. And,
of course, it could involve the state constitution, which would take the
problem off the table.
But I don’t think there is an exhaustion requirement. I don’t think
there should be one. And I think our federal rights are our federal
rights. And if someone’s violating them, and if you want to go to fed-
eral court and just take one shot you’re allowed to do that.
At the state level Oregon is a good example of doing this the right
way. In dual-claim cases, they have something like an exhaustion re-
quirement. The only other thing I would say, which is implicated by
your question, is when you do have two claims—state and federal—at
the federal level, it’s often a very good idea, I think, for the federal
court to certify the state constitutional claim to the state supreme
court. In fact, for a litigant, it can be a quick way to get something to
the state supreme court. You try certification at the federal district
court level, then you’re right there at the state supreme court. I think
the certification process could be improved from both sides—state and
76. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
78. Id.
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federal. I blame state court judges in part because it takes a little too
much time, and I blame federal judges in part because we’re too impa-
tient. But we’ve got to fix that system because it would be quite re-
spectful and very federalism driven.
Hon. Michael Scudder: Yeah, Nestor, go ahead.
Prof. Nestor Davidson: I just want to add one footnote to this
discussion, which is we do have one area of constitutional law where
we have this kind of exhaustion . . .
Hon. Jeffrey Sutton: For now.
Prof. Nestor Davidson: For now, and the Supreme Court’s going
to look at it. And it’s been very fraught in the takings context, which is
to say that before you can bring a federal constitutional takings claim,
you have to decide whether the state has or has not given you just
compensation.79 And in order to do that, you have to go through state
process.80 And the Supreme Court’s going to likely decide this year
whether or not that exhaustion requirement will survive.81 But it has
been quite controversial, and it’s created a lot of tension, precisely for
the reason Judge Sutton pointed out, which is that a lot of people be-
lieve that it denies the ability to get into federal court on the core
question of a federal right. It does, as a practical matter, require you
to litigate questions of federal takings law in state court and then be
precluded if you try to go back to federal court. So I think that there
are complications here that we should pay attention to and the Tak-
ings Clause is an area where we actually do have a body of law on
that.
Prof. Christopher Green: There is something to be said for hav-
ing the same rule for all the rights. You could have Williamson County
for everything, but that would be different.82
Hon. Michael Scudder: Okay, we’ll shift over to this side.
Stephen Casey: Stephen Casey, Austin, Texas Lawyer’s Chapter.
Within the last ten years, there’s been an increased ground swell of
people moving to Texas from high-tax, high-regulatory states, like
New York and California. It’d be interesting to get the panel’s perspec-
79. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
80. Id.
81. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 862 F.3d 310 (3d. Cir. 2017), cert. granted, No. 17-647
(U.S. argued Jan. 16, 2019).
82. See Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 172.
178 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:151
tive. Do you think it’s going to lead to a feedback in those states from
where they’re moving to a lessening of the regulatory burden and les-
sening of the administrative state, or do you think that it’s going to
boost Texas a little bit and turn it a little more “purple,” I would guess,
than blue?
Prof. Christopher Green: Well, a lot of those people are from
Mississippi; it tends to take our best people and it makes Texas better
and makes Mississippi a little weaker.
Prof. Nestor Davidson: I would just say one thing about that,
which is that people are moving to Texas, of course. But in many ways,
they’re moving to Austin, and they’re moving to Dallas, and they’re
moving to Houston, and they’re moving to San Antonio, and I think
one dynamic that we already see is that we have a greater level of
friction and I think it’s really developed over the last ten years. It’s
always been there, but it’s increasing with mobility between the policy
preferences at the state level in a place like Texas and the increas-
ingly divergent policy preferences in a place like Austin. And those
conflicts are playing out largely as a question of home rule—immunity
at the local level. If you look at the top ten fastest growing cities in the
country, four of them are in Texas right now. And I think it’s really
the urban areas in Texas that are drawing population. And that is
increasing the political power, relatively speaking, within the state.
The state may not be purple, but there are some really deep blue pock-
ets within Texas.
In the mid-terms, there was a story that could be told about even
the area around Fort Worth, which has traditionally been a relatively
conservative urban area, is now trending more Democratic. And I
think a lot of other factors are driving that mobility. But I do think it’s
a stark reality and I do think you can tell a similar story in Georgia, in
North Carolina, in Florida, and other places. I think it’s going to in-
crease tensions between the cities in a place like Texas, the Texas tri-
angle, and the State.
Hon. Michael Scudder: Over here, then. Sir?
Questioner 3: Thanks so much. Each of the panelists has talked
about the very distinct differences of state administrative law from
federal administrative law. Judge Sutton urged us all to read the local
state constitution, Professor Green remarked upon the tyranny of the
fifty state survey, Professor Seifter said, “No state administrative law
in law school,” and Professor Davidson said there are distinct, local
doctrinal differences in nondelegation. So what I’d like to do is have
the panel act as our ad hoc marketing firm, and I’d like a marketing
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suggestion from each of the panelists about how local lawyers can
highlight in an educational way the distinct local and state differences
to the bench and bar. What suggestions about highlighting the differ-
ences would each of you give us?
Prof. Miriam Seifter: May I recommend my forthcoming article?
Prof. Nestor Davidson: I would second that.
Prof. Christopher Green: Judge Sutton’s book, really, is far bet-
ter marketing than I’ve ever seen.83 It’s great.
Hon. Jeffrey Sutton: Well, I mean we should read each other’s
stuff.
Prof. Christopher Green: I should write my stuff.
Hon. Jeffrey Sutton: Knowledge is power in this area. It sur-
prises me to see so many disputes locally, city versus state, where peo-
ple are not paying attention to state constitutional opportunities.
Now, of course, that makes sense. At the federal level, the stakes
are so high you can afford to hire 100 lawyers to figure this out. You
cannot normally do that at the state and local level. But there are just
so many opportunities here to help a client, I guess is the way I would
put it. No one’s paying attention to this. Nestor made the point that
there is a distinction between whether a state is red or blue statewide
and how that breaks down within a state. That’s the Ohio story. The
cities in this last election became bluer, and the suburbs, particularly
the counties, and rural areas became redder. And that will lead to con-
flict from time to time.
Prof. Miriam Seifter: Yeah. So more serious than my previous
answer, I would say there are actually a number of ways to start to
build this familiarity. One of them we’ve already mentioned is teach-
ing classes in this. It’s very doable. My law school, in particular, was
very open to this. So if you’re a law professor, you can go to your law
school and suggest it. If you’re a law student, you can go to your law
school and suggest it.
Another is the state bar. Does your state bar have a practice group
or a focus group on matters of local government? Most of them do.
What about state constitutional law? Not all of them do. And then an-
other is thinking about ways to invest in state and local government to
have them create long-standing offices that are building up this
83. SUTTON, supra note 2.
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knowledge base and are available to educate people, to talk to people.
Those are all other ways than reading all these books. But really the
literature is great in this area and probably under-read to get this in-
formation out there.
Hon. Michael Scudder: Go ahead.
Richard Samp: Richard Samp with the Washington Legal Foun-
dation. I guess my question is for Professor Seifter. It’s a separation of
powers issue. Basically, what should federal courts be doing when
they have to decide state law separation of powers issues? I’m think-
ing of the case in the Supreme Court right now about gerrymandering
in Virginia, where the state legislature says, we have ultimate litigat-
ing authority over issues having to do with how we get redistricted.84
The state’s attorney general says no. In the Florida recount situation,
the Florida Supreme Court says, we are the ultimate arbitrator of
election results, and the state legislature says, no, pay no attention to
the state courts, we decide these questions. Are there any neutral
principles that federal courts can apply when deciding these state is-
sues? Or do they just have to read the state constitution and do their
best guess?
Prof. Miriam Seifter: This is a really hard and important ques-
tion. And in my article, actually, I talk about this as one of the costs of
the lack of clarity at the state level. For all its benefits, it does have
this feature where federal courts, and in particular the Supreme
Court, sometimes deny certiorari because this is a vehicle problem.
We’re not really sure if we’re even talking to the right state entity.
How to solve it in a neutral way, I mean I think probably the clas-
sic answer would be that you would look to the final decisions of the
state supreme court if there are decisions on a relevant question. But,
often, there aren’t. I’m not sure that there’s a ready solution to this. I
mean, other than certification or denying certiorari until the state can
sort its own house out.
Hon. Michael Scudder: Sir?
Brian Bishop: Brian Bishop. I come from Rhode Island, where, for
the first fourscore years, we didn’t have a constitution and operated
under the Royal Charter. But one thing that I observe about our sys-
tem—I’m wondering for the folks that research state and municipal
undertakings—my observation in Rhode Island, and I think it fits
84. Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 326 F. Supp. 3d 128 (E.D. Va. 2018),
juris. postponed pending hearing on the merits sub nom. Va. House of Delegates
v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 481.
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with the wider fifty states, is local government is actually far more
parliamentary in nature. So while you look very specifically at the
delegations, and it’s not that they don’t exist and that there aren’t an
alphabet soup of agencies, but the local municipal legislatures and
even state legislatures seem much less chary. And that’s simply com-
ing in and settling a thing or making, literally, an individualized zon-
ing decision at the level of a state legislative statute. And I’m not
actually sure that that’s unhealthy, at least in a small state with a lot
of access to the legislature. That has been a far more responsive ave-
nue for myself than the purported responsiveness of agencies. And I’m
wondering if you’ve looked at that in your undertakings.
Prof. Nestor Davidson: Yeah, so it’s a great point. And one of the
arguments that people make in favor of local empowerment is local
legislatures can be much more nimble. We don’t have a tradition of
bicameralism, for example. Again, I mentioned in many local govern-
ments there is no presentment equivalent, right? And so local govern-
ments can move much more quickly. There is also a tradition talking
about norms of non-partisanship. And, actually, in some states it’s ex-
plicit. Some local charters, some municipal charters, explicitly say
that local office holders cannot identify themselves by their partisan
affiliation. So it’s a very different norm. And you do, then, have the
ability in small and even medium size governments, but it doesn’t
work so much in a place like New York with 8.5 million people and
budgets that are larger than many states. But in a lot of smaller, local
governments, and even medium-sized, you do get individualized atten-
tion, and kind of an accountability feedback loop that’s very immedi-
ate. And I would say that courts have been a little bit chary of that as
well.
And there is a body of law, at least in the land use context and it’s
bled into a few other areas. But it’s clear it’s in the land use context,
where courts have looked at legislative bodies, for instance, a city
council clearly delineated as a legislative body, when they are making
an individualized determination. For example, amending a zoning
code in order to change the rules for one individual owner. Courts will
sometimes treat those legislative bodies as quasi-administrative. And
it has generated a really interesting body of law, largely around
proceduralizing. So you could have due process rights before a city
council if you think about the Londoner85 Bi-Metallic86 tradition. That
actually doesn’t apply in a lot of local governments. You actually get
fairly vigorous procedural rights as a matter of due process at the
state level before a legislative body. And I don’t know that that’s a bad
idea, I think that’s actually not a bad idea at all.
85. Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
86. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
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Prof. Christopher Green: And arguably, constitutionally com-
pelled because you can’t have bills of attainder. You can’t have local
bills of attainder. So Londoner/Bi-Metallic is important.
Prof. Nestor Davidson: Which, by the way, were local govern-
ment cases.
Prof. Christopher Green: Yeah.
Hon. Michael Scudder: Okay. Let’s jump back here.
Alden Abbott: Thank you, Judge. Alden Abbott, long-time mem-
ber of the Federalist Society. I think it’s fair to say that regulatory
takings doctrine is severely limited under federal constitutional laws.
Some total destruction of value, that sort of thing. To what extent are
state constitutional provisions in state litigation pointing to a broader
ability to recover under state constitutional takings clauses? In short,
is there more of an opportunity, perhaps, to find regulatory takings
under certain state constitutions? Is there a trend anyone could iden-
tify? Thank you.
Prof. Nestor Davidson: Judge Sutton?
Hon. Jeffrey Sutton: I’ll tell you the part of the story I know and
the part of the story I’m going to guess at. What I know is that, within
a year of Kelo,87 several state courts were rejecting Kelo under their
state constitutions, and therefore providing remedies for the plaintiffs
in those cases.88 Those are not regulatory takings. We’re talking about
eminent domain. But just to complete that story, and it’s not just a
state constitutional law story; it’s a state legislative story. The states
really responded legislatively as well.
So now I’m going to get to the part that I don’t know. But I have my
suspicions. You’re going to have a lot of state courts with respect to
regulatory takings now that would be much more sensitive to that
kind of argument than I think they would’ve been before Kelo. What’s
fascinating about how this works between the state and federal courts
is when you get a controversial U.S. Supreme Court decision that al-
legedly under-enforces a right, it makes the papers. Suddenly, the
state supreme courts are all over this. And instead of lockstepping,
they’re looking at it independently.
87. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
88. See City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio 2006).
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Prof. Christopher Green: Buck v. Bell was sort of the opposite.89
So when the U.S. Supreme Court says, “Well, if the feds said it’s
okay,” then that shuts down. But sometimes you get with Kelo the
opposite effect. There are lots of cases in Mississippi, certainly.
Prof. Nestor Davidson: And I would just add specifically on regu-
latory takings, you also have a dynamic at the state level which you
really don’t have at the federal level, which are state statutory re-
gimes that give property rights recognition. So in Florida,90 actually—
and there was a constitutional initiative on the books in Colorado in
the midterms that failed but would’ve had a very similar compensa-
tion requirement for any regulation that lowers the value of prop-
erty.91 So a very, very different doctrinal answer to the question of
incidental effects of regulation on property rights. But several states
have those property rights statutes, and they are constraints on regu-
lation, and they are compensatory regimes. And so that’s an important
distinction at the state level. Well, and that’s not so much constitu-
tional as it is statutory.
Hon. Jeffrey Sutton: The other thing as I think about it and lis-
ten to my co-panelists, it’s dangerous to pigeonhole these things. If you
read Judge Willet’s opinion in Patel, the way that it’s written, it looks
an awful lot like a regulatory takings decision.92 I mean, it’s a due
process decision under the Texas Constitution. But if you read it, it
really is very similar. So I wouldn’t think of it purely as takings.
That’s really the way he was framing the issue.
Hon. Michael Scudder: Sir?
Kai Allbrook: I’m Kai Allbrook from the State of Washington. Our
West Coast states have policies on climate change that are very much
opposed to those of the current federal government. As a result, you
see denials by regulatory agencies of permits necessary to create and
export infrastructure for carbon and hydrocarbon coal from the West
Coast. And I’d be interested to see how you would analyze state regu-
latory agencies frustrating federal policy and, in fact, interfering with
interstate commerce because of an ideological opposition to coal being
burned in China as opposed to remaining in the ground in Wyoming.
89. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
90. FLA. STAT. § 70.001 (1995).
91. See John Aguilar, Amendment 74, with Its Private Property Mandates, Goes down
to Defeat, THE DENVER POST (Nov. 6, 2018, 7:51 PM), https://www.denverpost
.com/2018/11/06/colorado-amendment-74-results/ [https://perma.unl.edu/5JFT-
DCXR].
92. Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing and Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 92 (Tex. 2015)
(Willett, J., concurring).
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Hon. Jeffrey Sutton: I don’t have a great sense for all of the par-
ticulars of the West Coast constitutions, but I will say this, this is an
important point about state constitutions and a big difference between
state and federal constitutions. The Federal Constitution is negative,
almost biblical—“Thou shalt not do this, thou shalt not do that,” and
so forth. State constitutions have many positive rights. Emily Zackin
wrote a great book about this, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong
Places, and makes the point that some state constitutions contain pos-
itive rights, such as education rights, labor rights, and environmental
rights. And I think about a third, at least, of the state constitutions
have similar guarantees.93 So now you have this interesting dynamic
where the state legislature, perhaps with state agencies, has an af-
firmative obligation to protect water/air resources. But, of course, we
know there is a Supremacy Clause, so that’s where it gets a little com-
plicated with potential preemption issues.
Prof. Miriam Seifter: And I would just add to that in addition to
the affirmative constitutional rights, another difference at the state
level is that under most state constitutions, state legislatures have
plenary power. So the state constitution limits them. It doesn’t enu-
merate their rights the way we have at the federal level. So I think the
answer to your question would have to proceed on two lines. One: Is it
legal under state law? And if the state legislature has said something
about this or if they’ve delegated power to an agency, often that’s go-
ing to be constitutional at the state level because unless the constitu-
tion says no, a state legislature can presumably do it. But then, of
course, there’s the federal question. So is it actually preempted under
the Supremacy Clause?94 And then you just have to do a close reading
of what the federal law is and what the state law is.
Prof. Nestor Davidson: And I would just add, I think one of the
hardest questions in all of this when you’re thinking about the federal-
state relationship, and, frankly, it plays out as well on the state-local
relationship, is: Do we really have neutral principles that apply across
policy disagreements? So we get these swings where in one adminis-
tration states are asserting policy preferences about immigration,
about other areas, and we look to how do we adjudicate those. And
then the politics change and you get a set of different states opposing
the federal government. And it is very, very hard, I think, to come up
with general, neutral principles in the kind of Wechslerian sense to
adjudicate that distribution of power. But I think it’s the right thing to
try to do whatever your individual policy preferences might be.
93. EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE CON-
STITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS (2013).
94. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Hon. Michael Scudder: I think we’ve got a little over five min-
utes left, so we’ll try to get the next couple of questions, and I may
offer a parting thought of my own. Go ahead.
Mark Middleman: I’m Mark Middleman from St. Louis. And this
is particularly addressed to Professor Davidson. A great part of our
jurisprudence in Missouri on local law is that there is no sovereign
power in local communities. Sovereignty is restricted to the state gov-
ernment, but as Professor Seifter suggested, it’s plenary. We have
what are called home rule charters, but they’re not really total home
rule because there’s some limitation on what a locality can do through
its own city council or its local legislative body. Do you find this in
other states that there is a difference in the administrative powers of
localities precisely because they don’t have complete sovereignty?
Prof. Nestor Davidson: Yeah, it’s a great question. And I have
found, again, in the world of our fantasy 90,000 local-government
surveys that home rule is one of those areas of state jurisprudence in
state constitutional law that varies, not only across fifty jurisdictions,
the District of Columbia has its own unique particular version of home
rule, but within states. And so you have a range that varies in really
broad terms between what we call a Dillion’s Rule state where the
only power that a local government has is that which is explicitly leg-
islatively delegated from the state,95 from that exercise of plenary
power, versus home rule,96 which in its strongest form in state consti-
tutional law actually changes that paradigm about where sovereignty
rests.
And so you have states—and a not insignificant number of states—
where as a matter of black-letter, structural constitutional law, the
state constitution actually says that at least with respect to local mat-
ters—and courts have no idea what that actually means—but with
respect to local matters, a local government, a city, a county, or a sub-
urb is sovereign. And so it’s a choice within the state. If you think
about the federalist system, sovereignty resides at the state level.
Within a state, a state constitution can make a choice to subdele-
gate—to locate—that sovereignty at the local level. And in many
states—I can’t give you a number because the jurisprudence is all over
the place—but in a critical mass of states, as a matter of formal state
95. See City of Richmond v. Confrere Club of Richmond, 387 S.E.2d 471, 473 (Va.
1990) (“The Dillion Rule provides that municipal corporations possess and can
exercise only those powers expressly granted by the General Assembly, those nec-
essarily or fairly implied therefrom, and those that are essential and
indispensable.”).
96. See TENN. CONST. art. 11, § 9 (permitting municipalities to adopt home rule).
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constitutional law, a great deal of that sovereignty that we think of at
the state actually resides at the local level.
Now as that has been litigated, and it gets litigated all the time,
state courts are reluctant to recognize that. And I have begun to noo-
dle on an article that I’m thinking of as home rule originalism because
you have a lot of these state constitutional conventions that have
adopted home rule not only were in the 1910s and the Progressive Era
but actually through the ‘60s and into the ‘70s. And so the founders or
framers debates are really accessible. And you have some home rule
constitutional amendments—and New York, frankly, is a good exam-
ple—where the founders’ intent was to be fairly strong on the delega-
tion to local democracies, to have a conception that people should be
governing themselves at the local level. And state courts haven’t
respected that at all. So the black-letter law of localism in New York,
which is the state I know best, the formal structure that we get in the
state constitution and the functional structure that appears in the ju-
risprudence are radically different. And so I think there’s an incredi-
bly interesting variety. And we haven’t quite figured out what that all
means.
Prof. Christopher Green: Bob Ellickson from time to time would
say, “Do you want to be James Madison? Do you want to be a
Founder? Well, go get involved in your local homeowner’s association
because that’s where you can establish a new polity and you will be
the founder.”
Hon. Michael Scudder: One last question.
Sam McVey: Sam McVey. I’m a retired Utah state court judge.
One of the reasons for giving judicial deference to and review of
agency adjudication proceedings is that these agencies are supposedly
endowed with a lot of expertise and so forth, and the judges are appar-
ently too technically challenged to figure some of these things out. To
paraphrase my former boss, a judge knows what he or she knows and
a judge knows what he or she doesn’t know. So if a judge doesn’t know,
can’t the judge just proceed under Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and its state equivalents?97 Get a special master to help
them on these technical issues and forget the agency bias that occurs
when you render agency deference.
Prof. Christopher Green: If they do know what they don’t know,
that’s great. I mean, the judges sometimes have the same problem.
Not these. [Referring to Judges Sutton and Scudder]
97. FED. R. CIV. P. 53.
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Hon. Jeffrey Sutton: Ouch. This is what happens now that you’re
a new federal judge. They’re not usually explicit about it. They laugh
at your jokes in your face, and when you’re not there, they tell you
that you’re wrong and full of yourself.
Hon. Michael Scudder: So thanks everyone. Let me offer a bit of
a suggestion, perhaps, to Dean and Steve. First, I think on behalf of
all of us up here, thanks for covering the topic and everyone’s engage-
ment. I can tell you from just talking to my colleagues on the panel
and reading a bit of their work, one of the questions that was coming
to mind constantly as I read this was there’s embedded in a lot of the
discussion a bit of a normative preference to govern at the local level
as much as possible, at the state and local level for all the reasons that
are obvious: closer to the people, and the like. And then as you read
some of Miriam and Nestor’s work—at least I did—I really realized
how much the state, local, municipal, administrative apparatus has
grown, and just how expansive it really is, and how many different
aspects of our lives it touches. And what also comes to mind is I read
very little about it from day to day. The local newspaper has tended to
focus on national coverage so much. The local newspaper is not at the
end of the driveway anymore. It fell by the wayside.
So one of the questions that I’d encourage the Society to consider
asking is: Are we really able to realize the transparency and accounta-
bility that is kind of embedded in this normative preference we have
to govern at the local level? Or put differently, are we realizing the
federalism benefits that I think are kind of embedded in a lot of the
discussion? Are we able to, or how are we better able to, perhaps? So
with that, thank you.
